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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
The Unique Effects of Relatively Recent Conflict on Cognitive Control
by
Jackson Stuart Colvett
Master of Arts in Psychological and Brain Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Julie Bugg, Chair
In tasks such as Stroop, our past experiences with conflict influence our ability to attend to goalrelevant information and ignore irrelevant information. There exists evidence that conflict
experiences on at least two timescales affect cognitive control. The “immediate” timescale is
evidenced by congruency sequence effects while the “long” timescale is evidenced by list-wide
proportion congruence effects. What remains underspecified is whether relatively recent
experiences with conflict may also uniquely influence cognitive control and how experiences on
different timescales are weighted. The present, pre-registered experiments aimed to assess the
role of relatively recent conflict by examining the potential effects of an “intermediate” timescale
(i.e., several preceding trials). A novel Stroop paradigm was developed to isolate the effects of
the intermediate timescale and cognitive control was measured via frequency- and contingencyunbiased diagnostic items. In Experiment 1 (N = 61), I manipulated the level of conflict
experienced in the intermediate timescale for lists matched in proportion congruence. Controlling
for conflict experiences in the long and immediate timescales, I found that conflict in the
intermediate timescale affected cognitive control. Experiment 2 (N = 60) found that the effect of
conflict in the intermediate timescale may depend on that conflict defying the long timescale.
These novel findings highlight the need to expand theories of cognitive control to incorporate the
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intermediate timescale and the interaction of the intermediate timescale with other timescales of
cognitive control.

viii

Introduction
Cognitive control processes allow the pursuit of goal-directed behavior in favor of
alternative compelling or habitual behaviors (Cohen, 2017). Prior experiences resolving conflicts
between competing responses affect cognitive control (e.g., whether a focused scope of attention
is engaged whereby processing of goal-irrelevant information is decreased and/or goal-relevant
information is increased, or a relaxed scope of attention is engaged). Consider driving a car on
the highway. A car suddenly cutting in front of you might elicit conflict that heightens your focus
on goal-relevant information, demonstrating the effects of conflict on the immediate timescale.
On a longer timescale, your focus while driving might be influenced by all accumulated
experiences since getting on the highway. For example, if the highway has been mostly busy (or
mostly empty), this will likely induce generally focused (or relaxed) attention. But what if you
suddenly encounter a lot of traffic in a stretch of highway that was relatively empty? What effect
will this experience on an “intermediate” timescale have on cognitive control? Will the control
system maintain a relaxed scope of attention (consistent with the long timescale) or will the
recent conflict lead to a heightening of control? If it does, will the heightening be above and
beyond that caused by the last car that cut in front of you (immediate timescale)?
Prior research on cognitive control, including computational models, has focused
primarily on effects of conflict on the immediate and long timescales. One such model is the
influential conflict monitoring account that proposed conflict monitoring as a mechanism by
which experiences with conflict lead to a recruitment of cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver,
Brach, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). According to this model, some control adjustments occur in
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response to conflict experiences1 on the previous trial. Consistent with this idea, individuals are
less susceptible to conflict after experiencing an incongruent (i.e., conflicting) trial than after
experiencing a congruent (i.e., non-conflicting) trial, presumably because control is heightened
when the previous trial is incongruent (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; for reviews, Egner
2007; Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014). These congruency sequence
effects are relatively transient (Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010; Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, &
Notebaert 2014) and exemplify how the “immediate” timescale of conflict accumulation
influences cognitive control.
In contrast, a different effect provides an example of how control is affected by conflict
experiences that accumulate across dozens (e.g., Bugg, Diede, Cohen-Shikora, Selmeczy, 2015)
or hundreds of trials (i.e., a block or list; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). The list-wide proportion
congruence (PC; what percentage of experienced trials are congruent) effect is the pattern
whereby congruency effects are smaller in mostly incongruent (MI) lists than mostly congruent
(MC) lists (see Bugg, 2014; Bugg & Chanani, 2011; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016; Hutchison,
2011 for evidence of list-wide PC effects when controlling for known confounds; for reviews see
Bugg, 2012; Bugg & Crump, 2012). The conflict monitoring account suggests that when higher
overall conflict is detected in the list, there is a subsequent increase in cognitive control
(Botvinick et al., 2001). In other words, the conflict monitoring model also captures adjustments
in control based on conflict accumulation over a long timescale and not just the preceding trial
(immediate timescale). Findings show that list-wide PC effects are observed independent of the
congruency sequence effect (Torres-Quesada, Funes, & Lupiáñez, 2013; Torres-Quesada,

The phrase "conflict experiences” is used here to refer to experiences with either conflicting (i.e., incongruent) or
non-conflicting (i.e., congruent) trials. The phrase conflict experiences is used rather than conflict, as it is also the
case that the absence of conflict is a signal for control adjustments (e.g., Schlaghecken & Martini, 2012).
1

2

Milliken, Lupiáñez, & Funes, 2014), suggesting that the long timescale is separable from the
immediate timescale.
While effects of the immediate and long timescales have been examined across hundreds
of studies, there are several theoretical gaps in the literature. Two important gaps were of interest
in the present study. First, do relatively recent experiences with conflict (i.e., the intermediate
timescale) influence cognitive control above and beyond the effect of the immediate timescale?
That is, do experiences occurring on multiple trials preceding the current trial shape the
heightening or relaxation of control beyond the effect of the immediately preceding trial? The
conflict monitoring account states that the amount of control on a given trial should be based on
“an exponentially weighted average of conflict over multiple preceding trials, rather than only on
the immediately preceding trial” (Botvinick et al., 2001; p. 639). This implies that conflict
experiences in the intermediate timescale should affect cognitive control.
Only a few prior studies have reported findings that speak to the role of the intermediate
timescale. In a flanker task with nine participants, as the number of preceding compatible trials
increased from one to six, reaction time on incompatible trials increased (Durston et al., 2003).
However, reaction time on incompatible trials did not significantly decrease as a function of the
number of preceding incompatible trials. Other studies with larger samples have found a
significant effect of several preceding trials, including multiple incongruent trials. In a Simon
task, reaction time declined on trial n as a function of the number of consecutive trials of the
same trial type preceding trial n for both congruent and incongruent trials (Horga et al., 2011). In
a Stroop task, congruency sequence effects were accentuated by multiple preceding congruent
trials and attenuated by multiple preceding incongruent trials (Jiménez & Méndez, 2013;
Jiménez & Méndez, 2014). These findings suggest that control is adjusted in response to conflict
3

experiences that occur more trials back than just trial n – 1, supporting a role for the intermediate
timescale.
The second gap concerns how experiences on different timescales are weighted and what
factors affect this weighting. Although the aforementioned studies (e.g., Durston et al., 2003;
Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014) provided evidence for
the intermediate timescale, these studies uniformly used lists with 50% congruent trials and
therefore they could not assess whether effects of the intermediate timescale might depend on the
conflict experiences preceding the intermediate timescale. For example, the weighting of conflict
experiences on the intermediate timescale might vary based on the long timescale (e.g., whether
it is MC or MI). The conflict monitoring account (and related models; see Blais et al., 2007;
Verguts & Notebaert, 2008), however, assumes a fixed learning rate (i.e., degree to which new
information is weighted when updating attentional settings; Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, &
Rushworth, 2007). This implies that the effects of the intermediate timescale should be consistent
regardless of context (e.g., preceding trial history).
Here, too, only a few prior studies have examined this issue. Aben and colleagues
developed a statistical model that documented the effects of different timescales of conflict
accumulation on cognitive control in the flanker task (Aben, Verguts, & Van den Bussche, 2017;
see Dey, 2019, for replications using a Stroop task). One key finding from this model was that
multiple trials prior to the immediately preceding trial (7 of the preceding 12 trials in flanker,
Aben et al., 2017; each of the 8 preceding trials within an 8 trial window in color word Stroop,
Dey, 2019) significantly informed the level of cognitive control on trial n controlling for the
effect of the other trials. This further supports that the intermediate timescale does play a role in
cognitive control adjustments. Most relevant to the second gap in the literature, another key
4

finding was that there was an interaction such that conflict experiences in the intermediate
timescale (recent trials extending beyond n – 1) were weighted less strongly in MI lists than in
MC lists. Aben and colleagues interpreted this to mean that recent experiences with conflict have
less of an influence on cognitive control when the long timescale biases individuals to engage
proactive control (i.e., sustain a heightened attentional bias across trials; Braver, Gray, &
Burgess, 2007) than when the system is relatively relaxed and dealing with conflict via reactive
control. This suggests learning rate may not be fixed, contrary to the conflict monitoring account.
To take stock, prior research provides suggestive evidence that an intermediate timescale
of conflict, and not just the immediate and long timescales, affects whether the scope of attention
on a moment-by-moment basis is relatively focused or relaxed. In addition, there is initial
evidence based on statistical modeling to suggest that the weighting of the intermediate timescale
may vary depending on the long timescale. In the current study, I aimed to further understand
potential effects of the intermediate timescale on cognitive control. One goal was to test a
prediction from the aforementioned statistical models (Aben et al., 2017; Dey, 2019) regarding
the interaction between the intermediate timescale and the long timescale. As noted above, the
modeling demonstrated that the intermediate timescale had a greater effect in MC lists than MI
lists in a flanker task. The present study tests this prediction in the context of a modified Stroop
task. Interestingly, and in contrast to the statistical modeling results, prior research has shown
that the effects of the immediate timescale, as indexed by the congruency sequence effect, do not
interact with the long timescale (Meier & Kane, 2013). This may imply an important difference
between the immediate and intermediate timescales, but additional research is needed to inform
this possibility.

5

Another goal of the current study was to extend the scope of the measurement of
cognitive control beyond a single trial as has been the typical approach to evaluating effects of
preceding conflict (e.g., trial n – 1) on control (trial n) in studies investigating the intermediate
timescale (e.g., Durston et al., 2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez &
Méndez, 2014) as well as the immediate timescale. To achieve this goal, I developed a modified
Stroop paradigm in which the effects of conflict experiences across different timescales were
assessed during a diagnostic phase of eight trials that followed the critical manipulations of
conflict. Through this change, I aimed to understand whether an intermediate conflict
manipulation produces transient changes in cognitive control limited to a single trial post conflict
or, potentially, longer-lasting adjustments. Effects on the immediate timescale are typically seen
as transient (fading after a single trial or long delay between trials; Egner et al., 2010; see also
Duthoo et al., 2014), but it is possible that conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale
produce a more sustained effect similar to experiences on the long timescale (e.g., Gonthier et
al., 2016).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 adopted an experimental approach to investigate the potential effects of the
intermediate timescale on cognitive control using a novel variant of the abbreviated lists
paradigm (Bugg et al., 2015). Each list comprised 26 Stroop trials. For expository purposes,
consider that there were two phases in each list (see Figure 1): an induction phase (18 trials) that
was followed by a diagnostic phase (8 trials). Phases were not demarcated from the participants’
perspective. The induction phase represented the long timescale and was MC or MI. The last four
trials of the induction phase represented the intermediate timescale. Critically, in half of the lists
in each PC condition, the intermediate timescale comprised only the infrequent trial type (i.e.,
6

incongruent trials in an MC list). This manipulation is hereafter referred to as a “present” or
“absent” window. For example, in a MCPRESENT list, the last four trials would be 100%
incongruent, whereas in an MCABSENT list, congruent and incongruent trials were distributed
throughout the induction phase in accordance with the PC of the list (in this example, most of
those trials were congruent).2 Consequently, for the key comparison of MCPRESENT and
MCABSENT lists (or MIPRESENT and MIABSENT lists), the long timescale was equated.
The effects of induction, including the presence versus absence of the window, were
assessed during a subsequent diagnostic phase. For all lists, the diagnostic phase was comprised
of eight trials. Critically, this meant that, unlike the prior studies investigating the transient effect
of the intermediate timescale solely on the immediately following trial (trial n), the current study
assessed whether effects of the intermediate timescale may be sustained beyond that trial to
multiple following trials. The diagnostic phase was 50% congruent and these trials were novel
words/colors not used to create the PC bias in the induction phase. The combination of these two
features enabled me to rule out explanations of performance on the diagnostic trials related to
item-specific mechanisms such as contingency-learning (e.g., Schmidt & Besner, 2008) and
bottom-up priming of a focused or relaxed scope of attention (see e.g., Bugg, 2014; see also
Braem et al., 2019; Bugg, 2017), and instead attribute differences in Stroop effects between
conditions to induced cognitive control. Additionally, I analyzed the diagnostic phase removing
the trial immediately following the induction to address the possibility that differences between
conditions were driven by differences in the immediate timescale. The key question was whether
performance on the diagnostic items would differ between present and absent lists, that is,

2

In MCABSENT, trials in the window were 70.9% congruent (34 congruent trials out of 48 total trials in window
across all lists). In MIABSENT, trials in the window were 27.8% congruent (13
congruent out of 48 total trials in window across all lists).
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between lists that had the same PC during induction (i.e., equating the long timescale) but
differing experiences in the intermediate timescale.
An account that includes an intermediate timescale of conflict experience that interacts
with the other timescales would predict Stroop effects following an MCPRESENT induction to be
attenuated in comparison to MCABSENT; the account would also predict Stroop effects to be larger
following an MIPRESENT induction in comparison to MIABSENT. Statistically, this would manifest
as a significant three-way interaction between congruence, PC, and window presence. However,
if the intermediate timescale has no influence on cognitive control beyond the long and
immediate timescales, no differences should be observed between present and absent conditions
(and therefore a non-significant three-way interaction). Hypotheses and data for both
experiments were pre-registered and are available on OSF (see link in author note).
Method
Participants. Sixty-one Washington University undergraduates (32 female, Age M =
18.49, SD = 0.64) participated for course credit. All participants were native English speakers
with normal or corrected vision and color vision. No participants were excluded.
Design and Stimuli. I adapted an abbreviated-lists design (Bugg et al., 2015) using 26trial lists presenting congruent trials comprising a word and color that matched (e.g., RED in red
ink) and incongruent trials comprising a word and color that mismatched (e.g., RED in blue ink)
(see Figure 1). Lists began with a biased induction phase. The purpose of the induction phase
was to present trials that induce relatively focused (i.e., MI list) or relaxed (i.e., MC list) control;
the effectiveness of the induction was assessed during the diagnostic phase, which was
equivalent between conditions. The key manipulation was the presence or absence of an
experience-defying four-trial window (i.e., in the intermediate timescale) at the end of the
8

induction phase, which preceded assessment of participants’ cognitive control during the
diagnostic phase. One set of stimuli (RED, BLUE, PURPLE, and WHITE in red, blue, purple, or
white) served as the Induction Set and was presented during the induction phase according to the
PC of the list. A second set of stimuli (words GREEN and YELLOW in green and yellow) served
as the Diagnostic Set and was presented during the diagnostic phase. A key feature of stimuli in
the diagnostic phase is that they were always 50% congruent. One concern in the present design
was that participants might become aware that the words/colors green and yellow always
appeared at the end of the list and this could inadvertently affect their cognitive control. To
alleviate this concern, two preventive measures were taken: First, a congruent and an
incongruent trial were randomly selected from trials 1-14 of the induction phase (i.e., two trials
from the Induction Set) and interchanged with a congruent and incongruent trial from trials 3-8
of the diagnostic phase (i.e., two trials from the Diagnostic Set). Induction Set trials transplanted
into the diagnostic phase were excluded from the analysis of diagnostic phase performance (and
vice versa). Second, filler lists were included in which 13 trials from the Induction Set and 13
trials from the Diagnostic Set were randomly intermixed throughout the list. These lists were
50% congruent and excluded from analysis.
Experiment 1 used 56 lists that were presented in random order: 12 lists for each of the
following: MCPRESENT, MCABSENT, MIPRESENT, and MIABSENT, plus eight filler lists. The order of
the trials within lists was pseudorandom. Each color was equally represented for both the
Induction and Diagnostic Sets. For incongruent trials in the Induction Set, there was an equal
number of each distractor, such that for an incongruent trial with the color red, the distractor
word was equally likely to be PURPLE, BLUE, or WHITE. The order of trials within lists was
fixed to establish the manipulation.
9

Procedure. First, a brief demographic survey was administered. After receiving
instructions to name the color as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy, participants
began the first list of the color-word Stroop task. For each trial, a word stimulus was presented
centrally on screen in 24-point Arial font. The word remained on screen until the voice key was
triggered after which an experimenter coded what response was emitted by the participant. Trials
on which the voice key was triggered by irrelevant speech (e.g., “um”) or extraneous noise (e.g.,
cough), or on which the speech was imperceptible or unintelligible, were coded as scratch trials
and excluded. There was a 500 ms blank screen before the next stimulus was presented. Trials
within each list were presented continuously (i.e., there was no break between phases within a
list). In between each list, participants had an opportunity to rest and verbally told the
experimenter when to continue. After completing all lists, participants were debriefed.
Results
In the current and subsequent experiment, an alpha of .05 was used for all analyses. In
addition, analyses of RT and error rate excluded trials with RTs less than 200 ms or greater than
3000 ms (0.95% of trials were removed; cf. Bugg et al., 2015), and analyses of RT also excluded
error trials. The induction and diagnostic trials were analyzed separately (cf. e.g., Bugg, 2014).
For each trial type and dependent variable, a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of
congruence (congruent or incongruent), PC (MC or MI), and intermediate window (present or
absent) was performed. All reaction times report milliseconds (ms). See Table 1 for descriptive
statistics. Only theoretically relevant inferential statistics are reported; comprehensive analyses
are reported in Table 3.
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Reaction Time
Induction items. In order to assess Stroop performance during biased (i.e., MC or MI)
trials preceding the diagnostic phase, trials in the induction phase were analyzed. Recall that the
induction phase comprised 14 trials pre-window and the four-trial window. There was a main
effect of congruence, F(1, 60) = 467.08, p <.001, ηp2 = .886, such that responses for congruent
trials (M = 599, SE = 11) were faster than incongruent trials (M = 702, SE = 12). The interaction
between congruence and PC (F(1, 60) = 286.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .827) was significant, such that
the Stroop effect (IncongruentRT – CongruentRT) was larger in MC than MI inductions (i.e., there
was a list-wide PC effect). In addition, there was a significant three-way interaction between
congruence, PC, and window, F(1, 60) = 70.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .541. The Stroop effect was
significantly larger in MCPRESENT (M = 163, SE = 7) than MCABSENT (M = 113, SE = 5), F(1, 60) =
107.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .643, whereas the Stroop effect was non-significantly smaller in
MIPRESENT (M = 64, SE = 6) than in MIABSENT (M = 70, SE = 4), F(1, 60) = 2.43, p = .124, ηp2 =
.039.
Diagnostic items. See Figure 2 for diagnostic phase results for reaction time and error
rate. In order to assess the effects of the induction on Stroop performance independent of known
confounds, the diagnostic phase was analyzed. There was a main effect of congruence, F(1, 60) =
298.82, p <.001, ηp2 = .833, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 620, SE = 12) were
faster than incongruent trials (M = 697, SE = 13). The interaction between congruence and PC
was significant (F(1, 60) = 20.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .251), such that the Stroop effect was smaller in
MC lists. However, this effect was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between
congruence, PC, and window (F(1, 60) = 18.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .238). Consistent with the
predicted effects of the intermediate window, MCPRESENT (M = 62, SE = 5) had an attenuated
11

Stroop effect compared to MCABSENT (M = 78, SE = 6), F(1, 60) = 8.94, p = .004, ηp2 = .130,
whereas MIPRESENT (M = 93, SE = 6) had a larger Stroop effect than MIABSENT (M = 76, SE = 5),
F(1, 60) = 8.95, p = .004, ηp2 = .130.
Finally, to assess whether results for diagnostic items were driven by a congruency
sequence effect based on just the immediately preceding trial of the induction phase, I reanalyzed performance in the diagnostic phase, excluding the first trial immediately following the
induction (i.e., trial 19). The results converged with the above patterns: a significant main effect
of congruence, F(1, 60) = 300.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .834, such that responses to congruent trials (M
= 617, SE = 12) were faster than incongruent trials (M = 696, SE = 13); a significant interaction
between congruence and PC, F(1, 60) = 14.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .194, such that the Stroop effect
was larger in MI; and most critically, a significant three-way interaction between congruence,
PC, and window, F(1, 60) = 8.15, p = .006, ηp2 = .120. MCPRESENT (M = 64, SE = 5) had an
attenuated Stroop effect compared to MCABSENT (M = 76, SE = 6), F(1, 60) = 4.13, p = .047, ηp2 =
.064, and MIPRESENT (M = 94, SE = 6) had a marginally larger Stroop effect than MIABSENT (M =
81, SE = 6), F(1, 60) = 3.95, p = .051, ηp2 = .062, although this difference was marginal.
Error Rate
Induction items. There was a main effect of congruence, F(1, 60) = 64.86, p <.001, ηp2 =
.519, such that congruent trials (M = 0.55%, SE = 0.11%) were more accurate than incongruent
trials (M = 4.70%, SE = 0.71%). The interaction between congruence and PC was significant
(F(1, 60) = 39.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .295) such that the Stroop effect was larger in MC inductions.
Finally, the three-way interaction between congruence, PC, and window was significant, F(1, 60)
= 12.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .177. MCPRESENT (M = 7.02%, SE = 1.00%) had a larger Stroop effect
than MCABSENT (M = 4.95%, SE = 0.64%), F(1, 60) = 8.42, p = .005, ηp2 = .123. MIPRESENT (M =
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1.85%, SE = 0.36%) had a smaller Stroop effect than MIABSENT (M = 2.82%, SE = 0.43%), F(1,
60) = 8.39, p = .005, ηp2 = .123.
Diagnostic items. There was a main effect of congruence F(1, 60) = 57.67, p <.001, ηp2 =
.49, such that congruent trials (M = 0.59%, SE = 0.17%) were more accurate than incongruent
trials (M = 4.01%, SE = 0.63%). The interactions between congruence and PC (F(1, 60) = 0.83, p
= .367, ηp2 = .014) and between congruence, PC, and window were non-significant, F(1, 60) =
0.42, p = .521, ηp2 = .007.
Although there was no hint of an effect of the intermediate window in the performance on
diagnostic trials, for completeness I performed the analysis excluding the first trial. This did not
appreciably change any of the above patterns.
Discussion
One important goal of Experiment 1 was to understand whether evidence exists for an
intermediate timescale of conflict accumulation controlling for the immediate and long
timescales. Experiment 1 found that manipulating the presence or absence of an intermediate
window in the induction phase affected cognitive control in the diagnostic phase. Incongruent
windows in MCPRESENT lists attenuated the Stroop effect during the diagnostic phase in
comparison to the MCABSENT lists; congruent windows in MIPRESENT lists exacerbated the Stroop
effect during the diagnostic phase in comparison to MIABSENT lists. The divergent Stroop effects
across conditions matched in PC but varying in the intermediate window experience (e.g.,
comparing MCABSENT and MCPRESENT) can be uniquely attributed to the manipulation in the
intermediate timescale. The long timescale cannot explain the effect as the amount of conflict
(i.e., frequency of congruent and incongruent trials) was equivalent between present and absent
conditions. This result is consistent with findings demonstrating that relatively recent experience
13

is weighted more strongly than relatively distal experience in statistical models of adaptations to
conflict (Aben et al., 2017; Dey, 2019). The statistical models also predicted that intermediate
conflict experiences would have a larger effect in the MC conditions than in the MI conditions.
Inconsistent with those models, the effect sizes were equivalent comparing differences in the
diagnostic stage between MCPRESENT and MCABSENT and between MIPRESENT and MIABSENT.
Based on these findings, Experiment 1 provides evidence of an effect of intermediate conflict
experience on subsequent cognitive control that would not be predicted by the long timescale
alone. However, it does not find evidence that the effect of intermediate timescale is modulated
by the PC of the long timescale.
Another goal of Experiment 1 was to see whether effects based on intermediate conflict
would sustain over the course of the diagnostic phase. An analysis that accounted for the effect of
the trial congruency immediately preceding the diagnostic phase was performed. That analysis
found that the effect observed in the diagnostic phase was not driven by differences in the
immediate timescale. This demonstrates evidence for a sustained adjustment in control following
the manipulation in the intermediate timescale.
Although the induction phase (long timescale) was equivalent between MCPRESENT and
MCABSENT and between MIPRESENT and MIABSENT conditions in that an equal number of congruent
and incongruent trials were presented, performances in the induction phase differed. Stroop
effects were significantly larger in MCPRESENT than MCABSENT for RT and error rate, and smaller
in MIPRESENT than MIABSENT for error rate (but equivalent in RT). This is clearly surprising from a
frequency perspective. One might be concerned that differences in the induction phase limit
conclusions that can be drawn about the critical comparisons from the diagnostic phase
(MCPRESENT vs. MCABSENT, and MIPRESENT vs. MIABSENT). However, the key question I aimed to
14

address regarding the diagnostic phase concerned whether the intermediate timescale in the
induction had a unique effect on subsequent performance. The differences in Stroop performance
in the diagnostic phase (i.e., Stroop effects were smaller in MCPRESENT than MCABSENT and larger
in MIPRESENT than MIABSENT) indicate that some element of the induction experience affected
cognitive control during the diagnostic phase. Given the differing patterns observed for the
induction phase and the diagnostic phase, it can be certain that participants did not simply extend
the global control setting that was in effect during the 18-trial induction phase. Instead, these
patterns imply that the entire induction experience was not being weighted equally from the 19th
trial onward in the diagnostic phase, which is consistent with the conclusion that the intermediate
window had a unique and influential effect on diagnostic phase performance. Said differently, the
elements of the induction that drove the patterns of performance during induction trials were not
identical to the elements of the induction (i.e., the window) that primarily drove diagnostic trial
performance.
Although the three-way interaction, and the specific direction of the performance
advantages observed in the critical comparisons (MCABSENT vs. MCPRESENT, and MIABSENT vs.
MIPRESENT) were anticipated assuming an effect of the intermediate timescale, one unanticipated
finding was that a list-wide PC effect was not observed when comparing MCABSENT and
MIABSENT lists (i.e., Stroop effect is typically larger in the MC condition). This stands in contrast
to prior studies that found a list-wide PC effect for diagnostic items (e.g., Bugg, 2014; Bugg &
Chanani, 2011; Cohen-Shikora et al., 2018; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016; Hutchison, 2011).
A methodological consideration is that the diagnostic trials occurred in a separate phase at the
end of each list. This design was chosen in order to assess whether the cognitive control
adjustments would sustain over the course of several trials following the intermediate conflict
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manipulation. In all prior studies, diagnostic trials were randomly intermixed with induction
trials throughout the list. It is possible that this difference may have affected how induced
cognitive control settings manifested on diagnostic trials. To evaluate this possibility, an
exploratory analysis was performed on the Diagnostic Set trials that were integrated in the first
14 trials of the lists and not included in the analysis of the induction phase. These Diagnostic Set
trials, like those in the diagnostic phase, were 50% congruent and comprised of unique
colors/words from induction trials; however, and most critically for present purposes, these
Diagnostic Set trials were intermixed among the induction phase trials and thus comparable to
diagnostic trials in prior studies. This analysis revealed significant differences in the Stroop
effect for diagnostic trials consistent with the PC of the induction (i.e., typical list-wide PC
effects).3
In summary, Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that the intermediate timescale of
conflict accumulation influences cognitive control independent of other timescales. However,
there may be boundary conditions for this effect. For example, in Experiment 1, the intermediate
timescale was strongly “experience defying” in that the window was comprised entirely of the
type of trial participants rarely experienced before the window (e.g., a window of incongruent
trials in an MC list). As such, in present lists, the intermediate conflict experience differed
markedly from the preceding experience (e.g., shift from 93% congruent pre-window to 0%
congruent during the window in MCPRESENT induction). Given this rather extreme shift, conflict
experiences within the window may have been quite salient and driven adjustments in attention.
3

The analysis assessed the reaction time for Diagnostic Set trials that were integrated into the pre-window section of
the induction. There was a significant main effect of congruence (F(1 ,60) = 178.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .749) and a
significant main effect of condition type (F(3, 180) = 7.88, p < .001, ηp2 =.116). Importantly, there was a significant
interaction between congruence and condition (F(3, 180) = 7.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .118) such that the size of Stroop
Effect was in accordance with the PC in the pre-window section of each condition (MCPRESENT = 88; MCABSENT =
74; MIABSENT = 63; MIPRESENT = 43). Note the limited power, as there was only one congruent and one incongruent
trail per list.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to assess the possibility that the effects of the intermediate timescale
depend on the experience within that timescale strongly defying experience in the long timescale.
One theoretical possibility is that defiance of experience generates a prediction error (e.g., den
Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012) as such errors have been shown to be consequential in
producing adjustments to cognitive control (Brown & Braver, 2005; Alexander & Brown, 2011).
To address this possibility, Experiment 2 manipulated conflict in the intermediate timescale while
reducing the magnitude of the prediction error between the pre-window and the window of the
induction. As in Experiment 1, each list was comprised of an induction phase followed by a
diagnostic phase. However, in Experiment 2, the induction phase prior to the window was always
50% congruent. Again, the last four trials of the induction phase (i.e., window) were manipulated
such that the window was entirely congruent, entirely incongruent, or unbiased (50% congruent).
The manipulation in Experiment 2 was employed to examine whether the effect of the
intermediate timescale depends on the level of conflict experienced during the long timescale. In
Experiment 1, the experience within the window strongly defied previous experience. For
example, an entirely incongruent window in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1 panel A) represented a
shift from 93% congruent pre-window to 0% congruent during the window in MCPRESENT
induction. In comparison, the experience within the window in Experiment 2 defied previous
experience comparatively weakly. An entirely incongruent window in Experiment 2 (see Figure
1 panel B) represented a shift from 50% congruent pre-window to 0% congruent during the
window in the condition with an incongruent window. The diagnostic phase was identical to
Experiment 1. Therefore, this experiment again had the opportunity to inform the theoretical
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question of whether effects of the intermediate timescale are transient or more sustained (across
multiple trials).
If the effect of intermediate conflict does not depend on defying the long timescale, one
would predict that the window section of the induction should drive subsequent cognitive
control. That is, the congruent window will accentuate the congruency effect (and the
incongruent window will attenuate the congruency effect) in the diagnostic phase relative to
other conditions. Statistically, this would manifest as an interaction between congruence and
window type during the diagnostic phase. Alternatively, if the effects of conflict accumulation in
the intermediate timescale rely on strongly defying previous experience, given that there is
objectively weaker defiance in Experiment 2, one would not predict a difference between the
three conditions. Alternatively, the difference may be smaller. Statistically, there would be a nonsignificant interaction between congruence and window type.
Method
Participants. Sixty-two Washington University undergraduates (43 female, Age M =
20.03, SD = 1.43) participated for course credit. All participants were native English speakers
with normal or corrected vision and color vision. One participant was excluded for falling asleep
during the task, and one participant was excluded for difficulty using the microphone. Therefore,
60 were included in the reported analysis (42 female, Age M = 20.05, SD = 1.43).
Design and Stimuli. As in Experiment 1, each list was comprised of an induction phase
and a diagnostic phase (see Figure 1) and the induction and diagnostic sets were identical to
Experiment 1. The pre-window section of the induction phase began with a pseudo-randomly
ordered set of seven congruent and seven incongruent trials. Therefore, the pre-window section
of the induction was unbiased (i.e., 50% congruent). I manipulated conflict in the four-trial
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window at the end of the induction phase (0% congruent, 50% congruent, or 100% congruent).
Contrasting Experiment 1, this meant that the long timescale was not equivalent across
conditions (induction phases were 61.11%, 50%, and 38.88% in the congruent, unbiased, and
incongruent window conditions, respectively); this experimental control was sacrificed in order
to manipulate the intermediate timescale while holding experience preceding the manipulation
constant. The diagnostic phase was equivalent to Experiment 1.
There were 44 lists in the experiment including 12 lists for each of the following:
unbiased with congruent window, unbiased with unbiased window, and unbiased with
incongruent window. Additionally, there were eight filler lists. Again, the order of the trials
within the lists was pseudorandom and fixed to maintain the manipulation. The order in which
the 44 lists were presented was random.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that there
were 44 lists of 26 trials.
Results
0.85% of trials were removed from the RT trim. All analyses used a 2 x 3 repeated
measures ANOVA with factors of congruence (congruent or incongruent) and window type
(100% congruent, 50% congruent, or 0% congruent). See Table 2 for descriptive statistics. Only
theoretically relevant inferential statistics are reported; comprehensive analyses are reported in
Table 4. Post-hoc t values apply a Holm Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979).
Reaction Time
Induction items. As in Experiment 1, induction analysis included the 14 pre-window
trials and the four trials in the window. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1,
59) = 242.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .804, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 614, SE = 12)
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were faster than incongruent trials (M = 719, SE = 15). There was a significant main effect of
window, F(2, 118) = 3.48, p = .034, ηp2 = .056, such that performance during an induction with a
100% congruent window (M = 662, SE = 16) was marginally faster than during an induction with
a 50% congruent window (M = 668, SE = 16, t = 2.043, p = .09) and significantly faster than
with a 100% incongruent window (M = 669, SE = 15, t = 2.49, p = .047); performance during
inductions with 50% congruent and incongruent windows did not differ, (t = 0.55, p = .58). There
was a non-significant interaction between window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 0.13, p = .876,
ηp2 = .002, such that the Stroop effects did not differ across conditions.
Diagnostic items. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 99.77, p
< .001, ηp2 = .628, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 629, SE = 13) were faster than
incongruent trials (M = 724, SE = 18). There was a significant main effect of window, F(2, 118)
= 3.39 , p = .037, ηp2 = .054, such that responses following a congruent window (M = 671, SE
=17) were non-significantly faster than performance following an unbiased window (M = 674,
SE =16) , t = 1.95, p = .111, and were significantly faster than responses following an
incongruent window (M = 683, SE = 17), t = 2.48, p = .048). Performances following a
congruent window or an unbiased window did not differ, t = 0.64, p = .526. There was a nonsignificant interaction of window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 0.42, p = .420, ηp2 = .658, as
Stroop effects did not differ across conditions.
Although there was no hint of an effect of the intermediate window in the performance on
diagnostic trials, for completeness I report the analysis excluding the first trial in the diagnostic
phase. Again, there was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 100.21, p < .001, ηp2
= .629, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 624, SE = 13) were more accurate than
incongruent trials (M = 721, SE = 18). However, the main effect of window was no longer
20

significant, F(2, 118) = 1.93, p = .149, ηp2 = .032. The interaction of window and congruence
remained non-significant, F(2, 118) = 1.38, p = .256, ηp2 = .023.
Error Rate
Induction items. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 74.51, p
< .001, ηp2 = .558, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 0.57%, SE = 0.12%) were more
accurate than incongruent trials (M = 4.01%, SE = 0.45%). There was a non-significant main
effect of window, F(2, 118) = 0.46, p = .630, ηp2 = .008. There was a significant interaction of
window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 4.30, p = .016, ηp2 = .068, such that the Stroop effect was
smaller in the congruent window condition (M = 2.17%, SE = 0.41%) than incongruent window
(M = 2.35%, SE = 0.51%) and unbiased window (M = 2.35%, SE = 0.48%) conditions.
Diagnostic items. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 47.96, p
< .001, ηp2 = .448, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 0.51%, SE = 0.16%) were more
accurate than incongruent trials (M = 4.18%, SE = 0.65%). There was a significant main effect of
window, F(2, 118) = 6.41, p = .002, ηp2 = .098, such that performance following an induction
with a congruent window (M = 3.03%, SE = 0.60%) was less accurate than an unbiased window
(M = 2.09%, SE = 0.51%), t = 2.91, p = .011, or an incongruent window (M = 1.92%, SE =
0.46%), t = 3.02, p = .011. Performance did not differ following an induction with an unbiased
window and an incongruent window, t = 0.57, p = .572. There was a significant interaction effect
between window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 5.06, p = .008, ηp2 = .079, such that the Stroop
effect was smallest following an induction with an incongruent window (M = 2.93%, SE =
0.59%), then a congruent window, (M = 3.2%, SE = 0.72%) and the unbiased window (M =
3.53%, SE = 0.63%).
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In the diagnostic phase, excluding the first trial, there was a significant main effect of
congruence, F(1, 59) = 43.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .424, such that responses to congruent trials (M =
0.46%, SE = 0.16%) were more accurate than incongruent trials (M = 4.13%, SE = 0.68%). There
was a significant main effect of window, F(2, 118) = 3.30, p = .040, ηp2 = .053; however,
performance following an induction with a congruent window (M = 2.80%, SE = 0.60%) was
non-significantly less accurate than performance following an unbiased window (M = 2.15%, SE
= 0.55%), t = 2.14, p = .103, or an incongruent window (M = 1.95%, SE = 0.49%), t = 2.16, p =
.103. Performance also did not differ between unbiased and incongruent conditions, t = 0.49, p =
.623. There was now a non-significant interaction of window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 2.14,
p = .123, ηp2 = .035.
Discussion
The key finding of Experiment 2 was that Stroop performance did not differ among
conditions during the diagnostic phase. Recall that Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were similar
in their manipulation of the intermediate timescale (i.e., four-trial windows that were entirely
congruent or entirely incongruent at the end of the induction phase) but differed in the prewindow section of the induction. The window section of the induction strongly defied the prewindow section in Experiment 1 and weakly defied the pre-window section in Experiment 2. Put
simply, the same intermediate conflict manipulation that was effective in modulating control in
Experiment 1 (i.e., presentation of four consecutive congruent or incongruent trials) did not
affect cognitive control in Experiment 2. I interpret this to mean that if the conflict in the
intermediate timescale sufficiently defies previous experience (as set by the induction trials),
then conflict information in the intermediate timescale may be salient and weighted more
strongly than distal conflict information. Prediction error potentially serves an important role as a
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signal to weight new information preferentially. If a large prediction error occurs, then conflict
experiences in the intermediate timescale may be signaled as important and thus affect control;
however, if no or small prediction error occurs, then conflict in the intermediate timescale may
not be signaled as particularly important. Although it remains to be determined what constitutes
“sufficiently” defying experience or a sufficiently large prediction error, this result demonstrates
a boundary condition of the influence of intermediate conflict experiences on cognitive control.
The results in Experiment 2 may be surprising when compared to studies that
manipulated conflict experiences several trials before the diagnostic trial (e.g., Durston et al.,
2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014). Those studies
used 50% congruent lists and found that cognitive control varied as a function of the amount of
conflict experienced on several preceding trials. One might expect that because Experiment 2
used a similar manipulation to those previous studies (i.e., a window of 4 congruent trials or a
window of 4 incongruent trials preceded by 50% congruent trials), then a difference between
conditions should have been observed during the diagnostic phase. The results in Experiment 2
are not necessarily inconsistent with the aforementioned studies, however, because of two
important methodological differences. First, the diagnostic trials in Experiment 2 were from the
Diagnostic Set, and they were therefore a different color and word than any trial experienced in
the window. To observe an effect on these trials, adjustments in control had to be sufficiently
abstract to extend from the induction to new stimulus features in the diagnostic phase. That was
not the case in the prior studies where diagnostic trials comprised the same features as the
preceding inducer trials. Second, Experiment 2 considered a larger diagnostic scope (n + 8 trials)
than prior studies (n + 1 trial). To know whether a similar effect was found in Experiment 2 as
the prior studies, one would determine whether there was evidence for an effect of the
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immediately preceding trial on the first trial of the diagnostic phase in Experiment 2. Some
evidence exists for an effect of intermediate conflict. Specifically, reaction time was slower
overall following the incongruent window in the diagnostic phase and error rate was significantly
higher following a congruent window in the diagnostic phase but neither effect remained after
removing the first trial of the diagnostic phase. This suggests much of these observed effects
could be alternatively explained by congruency sequence effects following the final trial of
induction.
General Discussion
While previous work documenting the effects of conflict experiences on cognitive control
adaptation has mostly been limited to effects of the previous trial (immediate timescale) and
effects of the entire block (long timescale), I aimed to examine the effects of relatively recent
experience (intermediate timescale). To that end, two primary questions were addressed: what
evidence exists for an intermediate timescale on its own or in interaction with other timescales
and do effects from the intermediate timescale sustain over several trials? Evidence for those
questions is hereafter discussed. Following that, I will discuss potential explanations and their
theoretical implications, examine limitations for the study, and explore future directions for this
research.
Evaluation of Study Goals
The first goal was to understand whether there is, as suggested by a number of behavioral
studies (e.g., Durston et al., 2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez &
Méndez, 2014) and existing statistical models (Aben et al., 2017; Dey 2019), evidence for an
intermediate timescale and to examine whether the effect of conflict experiences in the
intermediate timescale depends on other timescales. Experiment 1, controlling for conflict
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experiences in the long and immediate timescales, found a unique effect of conflict in the
intermediate timescale. In MC lists, presenting a run of four incongruent trials at the end of the
induction led to an attenuated Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase; in MI lists, presenting four
congruent trials at the end of the induction led to a larger Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase.
Strikingly, when comparing MCPRESENT to MIPRESENT lists, conflict experiences in the
intermediate timescale led to a reversal of the standard list-wide PC effect such that the Stroop
effect was smaller in MC than MI lists. Contrasting Experiment 1, Experiment 2 used an
unbiased pre-window section of the induction before the intermediate conflict manipulations. In
Experiment 2, conflict in the intermediate timescale did not affect Stroop performance in the
diagnostic phase. Taking both experiments into account, it can be concluded that evidence exists
for an effect of conflict accumulation in the intermediate timescale that plausibly depends on the
preceding conflict experiences in the long timescale. However, in opposition to the findings in
statistical models examining timescales of control (Aben et al., 2017; Dey, 2019), there was not a
stronger effect of the intermediate timescale (i.e., relatively recent experience) in MC lists than
MI lists. The current effect may be driven by defying previous experiences rather than the overall
conflict level in the previous experience.
The second primary goal was to understand whether effects from the intermediate
timescale sustain across a longer diagnostic phase. In comparison to previous studies (e.g.,
Durston et al., 2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014)
that examined conflict experiences more distally than the immediately preceding trial,
Experiments 1 and 2 broadened the understanding of the effects of intermediate conflict by
widening the diagnostic scope beyond a single subsequent trial to a phase of eight subsequent
trials. In Experiment 1, the intermediate conflict manipulation had an effect on the diagnostic
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trials which remained significant after removing the first trial of the diagnostic phase. Although
future research is needed to confirm this pattern, it suggests a potentially interesting difference
between the intermediate and immediate timescale. The latter is typically thought to produce a
transient effect (as indicated by studies examining the congruency sequence effect) but the
results from Experiment 1 suggest that that effects of intermediate conflict extend beyond the
trial immediately following the manipulation to other trials in the eight-trial diagnostic phase.
Experiment 2 did not find an effect of intermediate conflict. Therefore, no evidence can be drawn
regarding whether an effect was sustained or transient.
Potential Explanations
Though both experiments manipulated the experience of conflict in the intermediate
timescale, only in Experiment 1 did the Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase depend on conflict
in the intermediate timescale. One potential explanation considers whether it is necessary for
conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale to produce a prediction error in order for these
experiences to affect control. It is possible that such an error occurred in Experiment 1 but not
Experiment 2 given that conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale were likely more
salient in Experiment 1 because of the degree to which they defied prior experience in the lists.
This salience may have increased the weighting of that information in the intermediate timescale.
If the intermediate conflict was less salient in Experiment 2, it was also plausibly weighted less
strongly, encouraging the participant to weight all experiences acquired in the list relatively
equally. This difference would explain the significant interaction in Experiment 1 and the nonsignificant interaction in Experiment 2 for reaction time in diagnostic trials.
A second potential explanation interprets the results from the perspective of the volatility
modelling framework (Jiang, Heller, & Egner, 2014). In comparison to the fixed learning rate
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assumed in the conflict monitoring account, the volatility model incorporates flexible changes in
learning rate as a function of volatility, (i.e., the likelihood that conflict is relatively consistent or
fluctuates over the course of several trials; Jiang et al., 2014). When volatility is high, the
learning rate is also high and accordingly, more recent information (i.e., trials that have been
recently experienced) is weighted more strongly when informing whether attention should be
heightened or relaxed. When volatility is low, learning rate is low and a larger window of
(preceding) trials is used to inform cognitive control adaptations. By accounting for the amount
of trials that are weighted to inform attentional settings, the volatility model is capable of
forming hypotheses about effects on an intermediate timescale that depend on conflict
experiences in the long timescale.
Interpreting these results from the volatility model’s perspective, Experiment 1 is
considerably volatile on a list level (take MCPRESENT for example, where participants shift from
MC in the induction to entirely incongruent in the intermediate window to unbiased in the
diagnostic phase) and on an experimental level (shifting from MC to MI to Unbiased lists
randomly). Experiment 2 is less volatile on a list level (unbiased, shifting to a biased or unbiased
window, shifting to unbiased) and on an experiment level (most lists are unbiased or close to
unbiased). If learning rate increases with increased volatility and a higher learning rate leads to
stronger weighting of more recent trials (Jiang, Beck, Heller, & Egner, 2015), then Experiment 1
should have been more likely to yield an effect of the intermediate conflict. Consistent with this
model, it did. Interestingly this model also predicted the lack of an asymmetrical effect of
intermediate conflict depending on the long timescale (MC vs. MI) in Experiment 1. MCPRESENT
and MIPRESENT lists were equivalently volatile to each other; thus, according to the volatility
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model, the lists should have encouraged participants to use an equivalent amount of the
intermediate information in each list.
Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations merit further discussion. One is the conceptualization of relatively
recent experience as a four-trial window of conflict. This number was chosen because prior
behavioral studies had included examination of four previous trials (e.g., Durston et al., 2003;
Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014) and prior modelling
efforts found an effect of conflict at least four trials prior (Aben et al., 2017). To fully understand
the effects of conflict on the intermediate timescale, future research should examine different
window lengths. In addition, future research should also consider whether a window of a given
length (e.g., four trials) may have a different effect on control depending on the length of the prewindow induction, that is, whether the relative size of the window matters or just the absolute
size. It is possible that effects of manipulations on the intermediate timescale depend on what
proportion of the overall experience the intermediate conflict comprises.
In comparing the results of this study to previous work, some consideration should be
given to two key design choices: the abbreviated lists paradigm and the conceptualization of
intermediate conflict. While these design choices were chosen to fulfill goals of the study,
comparing results across studies should account for these methodological differences. The
abbreviated-lists paradigm was used to control for the long and intermediate timescales in each
list, while still achieving enough observations for diagnostic trials. Abbreviated lists allow for
more lists to be seen by each participant, thus allowing for sufficient observations for each
condition. Note that the statistical modelling papers that provided initial evidence for the
intermediate timescale (Aben et al., 2017; Dey 2019) were based on longer lists (lists ranged
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from 160 to 480 trials). It is possible that when the long timescale is based on a longer history of
trials then its influence on subsequent cognitive control changes. Another important difference
between this study and previous modelling efforts was the choice of manipulating intermediate
conflict experiences as runs of four trials of the same trial type. The statistical models (Aben et
al., 2017; Dey 2019) were based on naturally occurring sequences and examined the effect of
conflict experiences on the trials preceding the n trial. While it is possible that some runs of four
trials occurred in those lists, the effect of a conflict experience on the fourth trial before trial n
does not necessitate that all four trials preceding trial n were the same trial type (congruency). A
primary goal of this study was to find an effect of the intermediate timescale if such an effect
exists; it is likely that manipulating the four trials to be entirely congruent (or entirely
incongruent) represents an extreme case of an intermediate conflict experience.
An important consideration in the results of Experiment 1 is the absence of an asymmetry
between MC and MI conditions during the diagnostic phase. For reference, an asymmetrical
pattern would mean that the effect of the intermediate conflict manipulation was larger in the MC
condition than in the MI condition (e.g., Abrahamse, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2013), as observed in
Aben et al., (2017; see also Dey, 2019). An important difference in design regards the presence
and placement of diagnostic trials. The effects modelled by Aben et al., (2017) included only
biased trials; the list-wide PC effects in Dey (2019) included biased induction trials intermixed
with unbiased diagnostic trials. In Experiment 1 of this study, diagnostic trials were presented in
a separate phase following induction. The lack of asymmetry in the diagnostic phase for
Experiment 1 may therefore not be inconsistent with these models, as they do not model solely
diagnostic trials in a list-wide manipulation.
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Some theoretical consideration should be given to the surprising result in Experiment 1
that the manipulation of intermediate conflict produced a “reversed” list-wide PC effect
comparing MCPRESENT and MIPRESENT lists. That is, experiencing an MC list ending with four
incongruent trials led to a smaller Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase than experiencing an
entirely MI list (i.e., MIABSENT). Likewise, experiencing an MI list ending with four congruent
trials led to a larger Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase than an entirely MC list (i.e.,
MCABSENT). This finding may speak to the relative strength of conflict in the intermediate
timescale. While previous work has shown that list-wide PC effects are dissociable from
congruency sequence effects and are not just by an accumulation of immediate timescale
adaptations (Torres-Quesada et al., 2013; Torres-Quesada et al., 2014), no research has assessed
whether list-wide PC effects are made up of intermediate effects. Simply put, it is possible that
list-wide PC effects are driven by several preceding trials rather than whole lists. If adjustments
to cognitive control based on intermediate conflict experiences are more sustained than those
from the immediate timescale, as the findings of Experiment 1 imply, then intermediate
experiences may more plausibly drive list-wide PC effects.
Another limitation of the approach in the current studies is in Experiment 1, PC was held
constant across inductions while conflict in the window section of the induction phase was
manipulated. Therefore, present and absent lists in Experiment 1 also differed in how much
conflict was experienced in the beginning of the induction. It is possible that the initial
experiences in a list, rather than the lists differing at the end of the induction phase, drove
differences between conditions in the diagnostic phase. Experiment 2 did not differ in the early
lists, and significant differences were not observed between conditions in the diagnostic phase.
However, this explanation is inconsistent with previous findings that people flexibly adjust
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control based on later experiences following conflict experienced at the beginning of a list
(Cohen-Shikora et al., 2018).
It is likely the case that many factors contribute to the amount of trials that are
represented in the intermediate timescale such as the PC of the overall list (Aben et al., 2017)
and the volatility both within a list and experiment-wide (Jiang et al., 2014). At the same time,
experimental manipulations that affect prediction error or the salience of the intermediate
timescale may modulate its influence on control. Additionally, individual differences, such as
working memory capacity, may contribute to how many trials are represented within this
timescale. Individuals with a larger working memory capacity may maintain and use conflict
experiences that occur more trials back than those with low working memory capacity.
Conclusion
The present study demonstrated a unique effect of relatively recent conflict experiences on
cognitive control, further suggesting the importance of the intermediate timescale. The present
study also provided initial support for the possibility that this effect of recent conflict experiences
may depend in part on whether recent experiences are inconsistent with previous experiences.
Given that effects from the intermediate timescale were seen in the diagnostic phase after
controlling for the effect of the immediate timescale at the beginning of the diagnostic phase,
there is evidence that conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale affect control in a
sustained fashion. Further research should continue to consider whether certain conflict
experiences are more influential than others in terms of informing how people attend to and
resolve subsequent conflict. The results reported in this study demonstrate that theories of
cognitive control should consider the role of conflict experienced in the intermediate timescale,
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as it could lead to a better understanding of how previous conflict experiences are weighted and
inform adjustments to cognitive control.
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1. List composition for Experiment 1 (panel A) and Experiment 2 (panel B). Shaded
squares represent incongruent trials and unshaded squares represent congruent trials. For
Experiment 1, note the equivalent number of congruent and incongruent trials for each type of
MC list and for each type of MI list. Only the intermediate timescale differs between present and
absent lists. For Experiment 2, note the equivalent number of congruent and incongruent trials
before the window in each list. In both experiments, note that the diagnostic phase is equivalent
across conditions.
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Figure 2. Reaction time and error rate results for Experiment 1 diagnostic phase trials. Error bars
represent a 95% confidence interval. Panel A shows a significant three-way interaction was seen
between congruence, PC, and window in reaction time. The presence of the window attenuated
the Stroop effect in MC and exacerbated the Stroop effect in MI. Panel B shows a non-significant
three-way interaction between congruence, PC, and window for error rate.
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Figure 3. Reaction time and error rate results for Experiment 2 diagnostic trials. Error bars
represent a 95% confidence interval. Panel A shows a non-significant interaction between
congruence, window type in reaction time. Panel B shows a significant interaction between
congruence and window type, such that the Stroop effect was larger following a congruent
window in error rate. Note that the significant difference in error rate did not survive removing
the first trial of the diagnostic phase.
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Table 1
Experiment 1 Reaction Time and Error Rate
Phase
Induction

PC
MC

Window
Present

Absent

MI

Present

Absent

Diagnostic

MC

Present

Absent

MI

Present

Absent

Trial Type
Congruent

Reaction Time
570 (74)

Error %
0.51 (0.62)

Incongruent

732 (98)

7.52 (8.00)

Congruent

589 (79)

0.64 (0.80)

Incongruent

703 (89)

5.59 (5.27)

Congruent

620 (95)

0.56 (0.98)

Incongruent

684 (90)

2.41 (2.73)

Congruent

618 (93)

0.48 (1.06)

Incongruent

688 (90)

3.30 (3.19)

Congruent

636 (97)

0.74 (1.41)

Incongruent

698 (100)

4.39 (5.58)

Congruent

615 (85)

0.59 (1.32)

Incongruent

693 (95)

4.20 (4.54)

Congruent

607 (89)

0.69 (1.49)

Incongruent

700 (102)

3.62 (5.45)

Congruent

621 (90)

0.34 (1.11)

Incongruent

697 (98)

3.82 (4.20)

Note: Mean and Standard Deviation for trials in the induction and diagnostic phases of
Experiment 1.
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Table 2
Experiment 2 Reaction Time and Error Rate
Phase
Window Type
Trial Type

Induction

Congruent Window

Incongruent Window

Unbiased Window

Diagnostic

Congruent Window

Incongruent Window

Unbiased Window

Reaction
Time

Error %

Congruent

610 (96)

0.77 (1.08)

Incongruent

714 (121)

3.57 (3.22)

Congruent

614 (94)

0.62 (0.92)

Incongruent

721 (115)

4.08 (3.71)

Congruent

617 (95)

0.33 (0.63)

Incongruent

722 (125)

4.37 (3.63)

Congruent

622 (104)

0.62 (1.36)

Incongruent

720 (139)

5.43 (5.47)

Congruent

637 (101)

0.50 (1.23)

Incongruent

730 (138)

3.33 (4.51)

Congruent

626 (89)

0.40 (1.17)

Incongruent

723 (137)

3.78 (4.88)

Note: Mean and Standard Deviation for trials in the induction and diagnostic phases of
Experiment 2.
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Table 3
Experiment 1 F Table
DV
Phase
Reaction Time

Induction

Effect

Df

F

P

ηp2

Congruence

1, 60

467.08

< .001

.886

PC

1, 60

1.80

.184

.029

Window

1, 60

1.208

.276

.020

Congruence * PC

1, 60

286.28

< .001

.827

Congruence * Window

1, 60

53.33

< .001

.471

PC * Window

1, 60

2.16

.147

.035

Congruence * PC * Window

1, 60

70.74

< .001

.541

1, 60

298.82

< .001

.883

PC

1, 60

2.79

.100

.044

Window

1, 60

2.85

.096

.045

Congruence * PC

1, 60

20.16

< .001

.251

Congruence * Window

1, 60

0.03

.876

.000

PC * Window

1, 60

12.07

< .001

.167

Congruence * PC * Window

1, 60

18.72

< .001

.238

Congruence

1, 60

64.86

< .001

.519

PC

1, 60

44.21

< .001

.424

Window

1, 60

1.69

.199

.027

Congruence * PC

1, 60

39.15

< .001

.395

Congruence * Window

1, 60

2.30

.135

.037

PC * Window

1, 60

11.87

.001

.165

Congruence * PC * Window

1, 60

12.93

< .001

.177

Diagnostic Congruence

Error Rate

Induction
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DV

Phase

Df

F

P

ηp2

1, 60

57.67

< .001

.490

PC

1, 60

0.23

.633

.004

Window

1, 60

2.50

.119

.040

Congruence * PC

1, 60

0.83

.367

.014

Congruence * Window

1, 60

0.18

.670

.003

PC * Window

1, 60

0.04

.842

.001

Congruence * PC * Window

1, 60

0.42

.521

.007

Effect

Diagnostic Congruence

Note: F table for Experiment 1 results
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Table 4
Experiment 2 F Table
DV
Phase
Reaction Time

Induction

Diagnostic

Error Rate

Induction

Diagnostic

Effect

df

F

p

ηp2

Congruence

1, 59

242.68

< .001

.804

Window

2, 118

3.48

.034

.056

Congruence * Window

2, 118

0.13

.876

.002

Congruence

1, 59

99.77

< .001

.628

Window

2, 118

3.39

.037

.054

Congruence * Window

2, 118

0.42

.658

.007

Congruence

1, 59

74.51

< .001

.558

Window

2, 118

0.46

.630

.008

Congruence * Window

2, 118

4.30

.016

.068

Congruence

1, 59

47.96

< .001

.448

Window

2, 118

6.41

.002

.098

Congruence * Window

2, 118

5.06

.008

.079

Note: F table for Experiment 2 results
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